USMC:s roll i WW3

[Razgriz]

Om tredje världskriget hade brytit ut under Kalla kriget, vad hade då USMC spelat för roll i NATO:s försvar av Europa? Som jag har förstått det är USMC mer av en brandkårsstyrka som inte klarar av långvariga kampanjer, men som är snabba att rycka ut, i jämförelse med US army som skulle kunna bedriva en mer långvarig kampanj väl på plats.

 

Innebär detta att de kanske bara skulle användas initialt i konflikten eller skulle de vara någon sorts reserv som kunde användas senare om fronten stabiliterats till att agera "shocktrupper" och skapa genombrytningar i linjen?

 

Vet inte om det finns nå rätt eller fel på denna fråga, är total novis, men skulle vara intressant om någon upplyst kunde ge lite insyn i denna fråga

[dieseltrollet]

Den stora rollen för USMC i Europa var att förstärka försvaret av Norge. De hade en hel del materiel förhandslagrad där just för detta.

[eskil]

Den stora rollen för USMC i Europa var att förstärka försvaret av Norge. De hade en hel del materiel förhandslagrad där just för detta.

4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade var öronmärkt för Norge och hade sin utrustning (utom stridsfordon) lagrade i bergrum. Programmet hette Norway Air-Landed Marine Expeditionary Brigade (NALMEB). Motsvarande utrustning för en marinflygdivision fanns också lagrad.

 

Övriga Marine Expeditionary Brigades / Marine Expeditionary Units skulle antagligen också användas för att förstärka europeiska frontens flanker, dvs Island, Norge och Medelhavet.

[01/B3]

Mitt favoritämne!

 

Jag har sammanställt en hel del information om USMC i detta dokument:

NATO ORDER OF BATTLE 1989

Tanknet.org > Discussion Forums > Military History NATO OOB Mk VII

 

Läs och återkom gärna med ytterligare frågor och/eller synpunkter!

[Dobberman]

Där fanns det en HEL del att läsa.......

 

Är det mestadels begränsat till 80-90 tal?

[01/B3]

Just när det gäller USMC så tänker jag att noterna ger en bild av vilka möjligheter man hade under 1980-talet. Sedan så har jag sammanställt vilka bataljoner och flygdivisioner som tjänstgjorde på olika håll i världen just våren 1989 vilket kan ge en bild av hur förbanden normalt var utspridda.

[Razgriz]

Tack för alla länkar, där fanns det mycket matnyttigt , får se om jag kommer på några fler frågor att ställa senare

[01/B3]

Hittade några kommentarer som jag uppenbarligen inte lyckats få med i dokumentet jag hänvisade till ovan (angående MEU och MEB så är det tillagt information):

 

Note: This document reflects deployments as of 1st April 1989.

 

Note: The primary geographic orientation of the MEFs was II MEF – Europe, III MEF – East Asia and I MEF – global reserve. In the NATO context, two MEFs (I MEF, II MEF) were assigned as SACEUR's strategic reserve. It was common knowledge that their most likely areas of employment would be on the NATO flanks or adjacent to key chokepoints, such as the Turkish or Danish straits.

 

Note: Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Groups (SRIG) were organized in all three active MEFs. 2nd SRIG activated in October 1988, 1st SRIG in October 1989 and 3rd SRIG in 1990. See 2nd SRIG in the OOB for an example of the structure of a SRIG.

 

Note: The divisional reconnaissance battalion had as its primary mission postassault ground reconnaissance in support of the GCE. The mission of the Force Reconnaissance Company was to conduct preassault and deep post-assault reconnaissance in support of the landing force, as well as direct action.

 

Note: A Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the smallest of the three Marine air/ground task forces. MEUs are made up of about 1,900 Marines and are transported on three to five amphibious ships. They have weapons, helicopters, and AV-8B attack jets, but no fighter aircraft. In contrast to the larger task forces, MEUs are deployed routinely in peacetime. Two MEUs are always forward deployed: one in the Mediterranean and one in the Western Pacific or Indian Ocean. These units form, train, deploy, and then disband to ensure rotations of people and equipment about every six months. The deployed 13th MEU and 22nd MEU in this OOB illustrates the organization of a MEU. The four companies in the BLT hade specialized means of mobility: raid craft (boats), mechanized (amphibious assault vehicles), helicopterborne and surface landing craft.

 

Note: The Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) is a MAGTF built around a reinforced infantry regiment and an aircraft group composed by both fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Notionally, there were nine MEBs in the active force structure, although only six MEB headquarters were permanently staffed in peacetime. During a war in Europe, the Marines would send a brigade to Norway and thirty days of supplies and the equipment for one MEB are located in central Norway. The MEB deploys with 30 days of accompanying supplies and is capable of conducting combat operations of limited scope. The Amphibious MEB embarks aboard Naval ships to destinations throughout the world, where it can make an amphibous assault, take a beachhead and open a lane to project offensive combat power ashore. An Amphibious MEB would deploy aboard Naval vessels with more than 4,000 Marines. About 20 amphibious ships would be required to transport a brigade. The ACE of a MEB was normally made up of one rotary-wing MAG and one fixed-wing MAG. The r/w MAG could include the following squadrons: 2-4 HMM (CH-46E), 1-2 HMH (CH-53D/E), 1 HMLA (AW-1, UH-1N). The f/w MAG could include: 1-2 VMFA (F-4S or F/A-18), 1-2 VMA (AV-8 or A-4M), 1 VMA(AW) (A-6E) and detachments from VMGR, VMFP, VMAQ and VMO.

Aftar an amphibious assault the ACE fixed wing assets would flight ferry to a friendly air facility some 200 miles away while the MAGTF's helicopter assets are built up at a local airfield. The deployment of Harriers (AV-8B) with an amphibious MAB could be on amphibious shipping or as part of the fly-in echelon with other fixed-wing aircraft. The Harriers could, and most likely would, operate from the rotary-wing airfield, capitalizing on their basing flexibility. An Maritime Prepositioning Force MEB can be much larger, and project offensive combat power throughout its theater of operation. An MPF MEB would deploy to a theater where it would offload the required equipment from an MPF ship. Because this is a land-based force, it can be much larger than an amphibious MEB, bringing more than 16,000 Marines and Sailors to the theater of operation quickly. One MEB per MEF is required to be ready for embarkation within four days of notification.

 

Note: CSS Elements (CSSEs) were task organized at the MEU Service Support Group (MSSG); MEB Service Support Group (BSSG); and MEF Service Support Group (FSSG) levels; but only the MSSGs were fully manned and regularly trained as units. The BSSGs consisted of a headquarters nucleus and rarely receive realistic training as a unit. The FSSGs were permanent, functionally structured, MEF service organizations, which rarely deploy. The FSSG were structured for efficiency in garrison with its eight permanent functional battalions collectively providing the six functional areas of CSS, including supply, maintenance, transportation, deliberate engineering, health services, and services.

 

Note: Aviation support units divided between flying MAGs (MALS), MWSGs (MWSS), MACGs (MWCS, MTACS, MASS, MACS). Marine Aviation Logistics Squadrons (MALS) perform supply and maintenance for aircraft in the Marine Aircraft Group. Marine Wing Support Squadrons (MWSS) perform all manner of ground support, including the creation and maintenance of expeditionary airfields and landing zones, engineer support, bulk fuels (including aircraft refueling), landing zone support, supply, maintenance of ground equipment, and providing local security for the ground assets of the ACE. Marine Wing Communication Squadrons (MWCS) provide all communication assets for the ACE, including radio, satellite, wire, and data technology. Marine Tactical Air Command Squadrons (MTACS) act as the overall tactical command for an ACE. Establishing a Tactical Air Command Center (TACC), they allow the commanding officer the equipment and operations necessary for military aviation. Marine Air Support Squadrons (MASS) provide Direct Air Support Center (DASC) capabilities for control and coordination of aircraft operation. This includes operational planning, scheduling, and tasking of aviation assets based on the orders of the commanding officer. They also organize and pass intelligence to pilots and coordinate with indirect fire support (for example, artillery and mortars). Marine Air Control Squadrons (MACS) are responsible for air traffic control (to include ground-based anti-aircraft weapons), early warning & intercept control, air surveillance, radar control, and airspace management.

Edited January 12, 2009 by 01/B3

[01/B3]

Hittade också en OOB inklusive underhållsförband - och de är många:

1. Fleet Marine Forces Pacific

a. 1st Radio Battalion – Kaneohe Bay, HI

b. I Marine Expeditionary Force – Camp Pendleton, CA (MAGTF/CE)

1) 9th Communications Battalion – Camp Pendleton, CA

2) 1st Force Reconnaissance Company – Camp Pendleton, CA

3) 1st Remote Piloted Vehicle Company – 29 Palms, CA

4) 3rd Remote Piloted Vehicle Company – 29 Palms, CA

5) 1st Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company – Camp Pendleton, CA

6) 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MAGTF/CE), Amphibious, associated with Amphibious Group 1

7) 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade – 29 Palms, CA (MAGTF/CE), MPF, associated with MPS Squadron 3

8) 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MAGTF/CE)

9) 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MAGTF/CE)

10) 1st Marine Division – Camp Pendleton, CA (GCE)

a) HQ Battalion

b) 1st Marine Regiment (With Responsibility of sourcing WESTPAC MEU)

i) HQ Company: 24 TOW (AT-platoon), 258 men

ii) 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment: 864 men

iii) 1st Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment: 864 men

iv) 1st Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment: 864 men

c) 5th Marine Regiment (Designated GCE for 5th MEB)

i) HQ Company: 24 TOW (AT-platoon), 258 men

ii) 2nd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment: 864 men

iii) 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment: 864 men

iv) 2nd Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment: 864 men

d) 7th Marine Regiment (Designated GCE for 7th MEB)

i) HQ Company: 24 TOW (AT-platoon), 258 men

ii) 1st Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment: 864 men

iii) 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment: 864 men

iv) 3rd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment: 864 men (Training at Air-Ground combat Center - 29 Palms)

e) 11th Marine Regiment (including 48 M101A1 for contingency purposes )

i) HQ Battery, 359 men

ii) 1st Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment: 24 M198, 8 M114A1, 938 men (Designated Direct Support bn for RLT 1, tasked with the WESTPAC deployment )

iii) 2nd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment: 16 M198, 8 M114A1, 751 men (Designated Direct Support bn for RLT 5)

iv) 3rd Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment: 16 M198, 8 M114A1, 751 men (Designated Direct Support bn for RLT 7)

v) 5th Battalion, 11th Marine Regiment: 12 M109A3, 12 M110A2, 709 men (General Support)

f) 1st Tank Battalion

i) HQ and Service Company: 2 M60A1, 1 M88A1, 320 men

ii) AT (TOW) Company: 72 TOW HMMWV, 246 men

iii) 4 Tank Companies: 17 M60A1, 1 M88A1, 105 men each

g) 3rd Tank Battalion – 29 Palms, CA

i) HQ and Service Company: 2 M60A1, 1 M88A1, 320 men

ii) AT (TOW) Company: 72 TOW HMMWV, 246 men

iii) 3 Tank Companies: 17 M60A1, 1 M88A1, 105 men each

h) 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion

i) HQ and Service Company: 4 LAV-25, 8 LAV-C2, 16 LAV-L, 2 LAV-R

ii) Weapons Company: 10 LAV-25, 16 LAV-AT, 8 LAV-M, 1 LAV-R

iii) 3 Light Armored Infantry Companies: 14 LAV-25, 1 LAV-R, 56 scouts each

i) 3rd Light Armored Infantry Battalion(-) – 29 Palms, CA

i) HQ and Service Company: 4 LAV-25, 8 LAV-C2, 16 LAV-L, 2 LAV-R

ii) Weapons Company: 10 LAV-25, 16 LAV-AT, 8 LAV-M, 1 LAV-R

iii) 2 Light Armored Infantry Companies: 14 LAV-25, 1 LAV-R, 56 scouts each

j) 1st Reconnaissance Battalion

i) HQ and Service Company: 102 men

ii) 3 Reconnaissance Companies: 79 men each (12 teams of 4 men each)

k) 3rd Assault Amphibian Battalion

i) HQ and Service Company: 15 AAVP-7, 3 AAVC-7, 2 AAVR-7, 237 men

ii) 4 Assault Amphibian Companies: 43 AAVP-7, 3 AAVC-3, 1 AAVR-7, 226 men each

l) 1st Combat Engineer Battalion

i) HQ and Service Company: 143 men

ii) Engineer Support Company: 259 men

iii) 4 Combat Engineer Companies (1 in cadre status): 114 men each

11) 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing – El Toro, CA (ACE)

a) Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 3

b) Marine Wing Support Group 37 – El Toro, CA

i) Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 37 – El Toro

ii) Marine Wing Support Squadron 371 – Yuma, AZ

iii) Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 – Camp Pendleton, CA

iv) Marine Wing Support Squadron 373 – El Toro, CA

v) Marine Wing Support Squadron 374 – Tustin, CA

c) Marine Air Control Group 38 – El Toro, CA

i) Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 38 – El Toro

ii) 2nd Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion – Yuma, AZ: 18 I-Hawk, 751 men

iii) Battery B, 3rd LAAM Battalion – Yuma, AZ: 6 I-Hawk, 149 men

iv) 3rd Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion(-) – Camp Pendleton, CA: 90 Stinger, 377 men

v) Marine Wing Communication Squadron 38 – El Toro, CA

vi) Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron 38 – Tustin, CA

vii) Marine Air Support Squadron 3 – Camp Pendleton, CA

viii) Marine Air Control Squadron 1 – Camp Pendleton, CA

ix) Marine Air Control Squadron 7 – Yuma, AZ

d) Marine Aircraft Group 11 – El Toro, CA (Designated F/W host MAG for 7th MEB)

i) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 11

ii) VMA(AW)-121 “Green Knights”: 10 A6E, at sea aboard USS Ranger (CV 61) (converted to F/A-18D on Dec. 8, 89)

iii) VMFA-323 “Death Rattlers”: 12 F/A-18A (converted March 83)

iv) VMFA-531 “Grey Ghosts”: 12 F/A-18A (converted 83)

v) VMFP-3(-) “Eyes of the Corps”: 11 RF-4B

vi) VMGR-352 “Raiders”: 6 KC-130F, 9 KC-130R

vii) VMFAT-101 “Sharpshooters”: 15 F/A-18A, 15 F/A-18C (FRS, Non-Deployable)

e) Marine Aircraft Group 13 – Yuma, AZ (Designated F/W host MAG for 5th MEB)

i) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 13

ii) VMA-214 “Black Sheep”: 12 A-4M (converted to AV-8B Night Attack, June 89)

iii) VMA-311 “Tomcats”: 20 AV-8B

iv) VMA-513(-) “Flying Nightmares”: 14 AV-8B

f) Marine Aircraft Group 16 – Tustin, CA (Designated R/W host MAG for 7th MEB)

i) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 16

ii) HMM-163 “Evil Eyes”: 12 CH-46E

iii) HMM-164 “Knightriders”: 12 CH-46E

iv) HMM-166 “Sea Elks”: 12 CH-46E

v) HMM-268 “Red Dragons”: 12 CH-46E

vi) HMH-361 “Flying Tigers”: 16 CH-53D

vii) HMH-462 “Heavy Haulers”: 16 CH-53D

viii) HMH-465(-) “War Horses”: 12 CH-53E

ix) HMH-466 “Wolf Pack”: 12 CH-53E

x) HMT-301 ”Windwalkers”: 9 CH-46E (FRS, Non-Deployable)

xi) HMT-302 ”Phoenix”: 12 CH-53A, 11 CH-53E (FRS, Non-Deployable)

g) Marine Aircraft Group 39 – El Toro, CA (Designated R/W host MAG for 5th MEB)

i) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 39

ii) HMLA-169 “Vipers”: 12 AH-1, 12 UH-1N

iii) HMLA-267 “Stingers”: 10 AH-1W, 14 UH-1N

iv) HMLA-367 “Scarface”: 14 AH-1J, 10 UH-1N

v) VMO-2(-) ”Cherry Deuce”: 9 OV-10A, 8 OV-10B

vi) HMT-303 “Atlas”: 12 AH-1J, 9 UH-1N (FRS, Non-Deployable)

12) 1st Force Service Support Group (CSSE) – Camp Pendleton, CA

a) MEU Service Support Group 11 (CSSE for 11th MEU)

b) MEU Service Support Group 15 (CSSE for 15th MEU)

c) Brigade Service Support Group 5 (CSSE for 5th MEB)

d) Brigade Service Support Group 7 (CSSE for 7th MEB)

e) HQ&Services Battalion

f) 7th Motor Transport Battalion

g) 1st Maintenance Battalion

h) 7th Engineer Support Battalion

i) 1st Landing Support Battalion

j) 1st Supply Battalion

k) 1st Medical Battalion

l) 1st Dental Battalion

c. 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade – Kaneohe Bay, HI (MAGTF/CE), MPF, associated with MPS Squadron 3

1) 3rd Marine Regiment (GCE)

a) HQ Company: 24 TOW (AT-platoon), 258 men

b) 1st Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment: 864 men

c) 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment: 864 men

d) 1st Battalion 12th Marine Regiment: 24 M198, 799 men

2) Marine Aircraft Group 24 (R/W host MAG for ACE)

a) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 24

b) Marine Wing Support Squadron 173

c) Marine Air Control Squadron 2

d) det B MATCS-18

e) VMFA-212 “Lancers”: 12 F/A-18C (converted from F-4S late 88-early 89)

f) VMFA-232 “Red Devils”: 14 F-4S (converted to F/A-18C mid-89)

g) VMFA-235 “Death Angels”: 14 F-4S (converted to F/A-18C mid-89)

h) HMM-165 “White Knights”: 12 CH-46E

i) HMM-262 “Flying Tigers”: 12 CH-46E

j) HMM-364 “Purple Foxes”: 12 CH-46 (SR&M)

k) HMH-463 “Pineapples”: 16 CH-53

3) Brigade Service Support Group 1 (CSSE)

a) HQ&Services Company, HQ&Services Battalion 3rd FSSG

b) Motor Transport Company, 9th Motor Transport Battalion

c) Maintenance Company, 3rd Maintenance Battalion

d) Supply Company, 3rd Supply Battalion

e) Medical Company, 3rd Medical Battalion

f) Dental Company, 3rd Dental Battalion

g) Combat Engineer Company A, 3rd Combat Engineer Battalion, 114 men

d. III Marine Expeditionary Force – Okinawa, Japan (Under operation control of 7th Fleet)

1) 7th Communications Battalion – Okinawa, Japan

2) 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MAGTF/CE), deployed to Western Pacific (WESTPAC) aboard USS Belleau Wood (LHA-3) Amphibious Ready Group

a) BLT 3/1 (GCE)

i) 3rd Battalion 1st Marine Regiment (Parent 1st Marine Regiment): 1103 men

ii) Artillery Battery (Parent 11th Marine Regiment): 4 M198, 4 M101A1

iii) Tank Platoon: 5 M60A1

iv) Amphibious Assault Vehicle Platoon: 12 AAV

v) Reconnaissance Platoon

vi) Combat Engineer Platoon

b) HMM-161(Composite) (ACE)

i) HMM-161 “Greyhawks”: 12 CH-46E (Parent MAG-16)

ii) det HMLA-369: 4 AH-1T, 3 UH-1N

iii) det HMH-465: 4 CH-53E

iv) det VMA-513: 6 AV-8B

c) MEU Service Support Group 13 (CSSE)

3) 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MAGTF/CE), Amphibious, associated with Amphibious Group 1

4) 3rd Marine Division (GCE)

a) HQ Battalion

b) 4th Marine Regiment (Designated GCE for 9th MEB)

i) HQ Company: 24 TOW (AT-platoon), 258 men

ii) 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment: 905 men

iii) 3rd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment: 905 men

c) 9th Marine Regiment

i) HQ Company: 24 TOW (AT-platoon), 258 men

ii) 2nd Battalion, 3rd Marine Regiment: 864 men

iii) 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment: 905 men

iv) 2nd Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment: 905 men

d) 12th Marine Regiment(-) (including 48 M101A1 for contingency purposes )

i) HQ Battery: 311 men

ii) 2nd Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment: 24 M198, 751 men (Designated Direct Support bn for RLT 4)

iii) 3rd Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment(-): 16 M198, 564 men (Designated Direct Support bn for RLT 9)

iv) 4th Battalion, 12th Marine Regiment: 18 M198, 514 men (General Support)

e) 1st Armored Assault Battalion

i) HQ and Service Company

ii) 2 Tank Companies: 17 M60A1, 1 M88A1, 105 men each

iii) 2 Assault Amphibian Companies: 43 AAVP-7, 3 AAVC-3, 1 AAVR-7, 226 men each

iv) Light Armored Infantry Company C, 3rd Light Armored Infantry Battalion: 14 LAV-25, 1 LAV-R, 56 scouts

f) 3rd Reconnaissance Battalion

i) HQ and Service Company: 102 men

ii) 3 Reconnaissance Companies: 79 men each (12 teams of 4 men each)

g) 3rd Combat Engineer Battalion(-)

i) HQ and Service Company: 143 men

ii) Engineer Support Company: 259 men

iii) 3 Combat Engineer Companies (1 in cadre status): 114 men each

5) 1st Marine Aircraft Wing (ACE)

a) Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron-1

b) Marine Wing Support Group 17 – Futenma, Japan

i) Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 17

ii) Marine Wing Support Squadron 171 – Iwakuni, Japan

iii) Marine Wing Support Squadron 172 – Futenma, Japan

iv) Marine Wing Support Squadron 174 – Futenma, Japan

c) Marine Air Control Group 18 – Futenma, Japan

i) Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 18

ii) 1st Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion(-): 12 I-Hawk, 602 men

iii) 1st Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion: 90 Stinger, 377 men

iv) Marine Wing Communication Squadron 18

v) Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron 18(-)

vi) Marine Air Support Squadron 2

vii) Marine Air Control Squadron 4

d) Marine Aircraft Group 12 – Iwakuni, Japan (Designated F/W host MAG for 1st MEB)

i) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 12

ii) VMA(AW)-224 “Bengals”: 10 A-6E (Parent MAG-14)

iii) VMA-211 “Wake Island Avengers”: 12 A-4M (Parent MAG-13)

iv) VMFA-333 “Shamrocks”: 12 F/A-18 (Parent MAG-31) (converted from F-4S in 87)

v) VMFA-314 “Black Knights” – MCAS El Toro, CA: 12 F/A-18A (Parent MAG-11) (converted Jan 83)

vi) Dec C VMFP-3

vii) Det X VMAQ-2

e) Marine Aircraft Group 15 – Iwakuni, Japan (Designated F/W host MAG for 9th MEB), deactivated 1989

f) Marine Aircraft Group 36 – Futenma, Japan (Designated R/W host MAG for 9th MEB)

i) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 36

ii) Det B VMO-1, Det C VMO-2: 4 OV-10A, 3 OV-10D

iii) VMGR-152 ”Sumos”: 13 KC-130

iv) HMM-265 “Dragons”: 12 CH-46E (Parent MAG-24)

v) HMH-363 “Red Lions”: 16 CH-53D (Parent MAG-16)

vi) HMLA-369(-) “Gunfighters”: 8 AH-1W, 9 UH-1N (Parent MAG-39)

6) 3rd Force Service Support Group (CSSE) – Okinawa, Japan

a) Brigade Service Support Group 9 (CSSE for 9th MEB)

b) HQ&Services Battalion(-)

c) 9th Motor Transport Battalion(-)

d) 3rd Maintenance Battalion(-)

e) 9th Engineer Support Battalion

f) 3rd Landing Support Battalion

g) 3rd Supply Battalion(-)

h) 3rd Medical Battalion(-)

i) 3rd Dental Battalion(-)

2. Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic – Camp Lejeune, NC

a. 2nd Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group – Camp Lejeune, NC

1) HQ&Services Company

2) 8th Communications Battalion

3) 2nd Radio Battalion

4) 2nd Intelligence Company

5) 2nd Force Reconnaissance Company

6) 2nd Remote Piloted Vehicle Company

7) 2nd Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company

b. 22nd MEU (MAGTF/CE), deployed as Landing Force 6th Fleet (LF6F) aboard USS Guadalcanal (LPH-7) ARG

1) BLT 3/8 (GCE)

a) 3rd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment (Parent 8th Marine Regiment): 1103 men

b) Artillery Battery (Parent 10th Marine Regiment): 4 M198, 4 M101A1

c) Tank Platoon: 5 M60A1

d) Amphibious Assault Vehicle Platoon: 12 AAV

e) Reconnaissance Platoon

f) Combat Engineer Platoon

2) HMM-162(Composite) (ACE)

a) HMM-162 “Golden Eagles”: 12 CH-46E (Parent MAG-29)

b) det HMLA-269: 4 AH-1T, 3 UH-1N

c) det HMH-464: 4 CH-53E

3) MEU Service Support Group 22 (CSSE)

c. 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MAGTF/CE)

d. 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MAGTF/CE)

e. II Marine Expeditionary Force (MAGTF/CE)

1) 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MAGTF/CE), Amphibious, associated with Amphibious Group 2

2) 6th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MAGTF/CE), MPF, associated with MPS Squadron 1

3) 2nd Marine Division (Designated GCE for II MEF)

a) HQ Battalion

b) 2nd Marine Regiment (Designated GCE for 4th MEB)

i) HQ Company: 24 TOW (AT-platoon), 258 men

ii) 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment: 905 men

iii) 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment: 905 men

c) 6th Marine Regiment (Designated GCE for 6th MEB)

i) HQ Company: 24 TOW (AT-platoon), 258 men

ii) 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment: 905 men

d) 8th Marine Regiment (With Responsibility of sourcing 6th Fleet MEU)

i) HQ Company: 24 TOW (AT-platoon), 258 men

ii) 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment: 1103 men

iii) 2nd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment: 1103 men

iv) 2nd Battalion, 4th Marine Regiment: 1103 men

e) 10th Marine Regiment (including 48 M101A1 for contingency purposes )

i) HQ Battery, 359 men

ii) 1st Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment: 16 M198, 8 M114A1, 751 men (Designated Direct Support bn for RLT 2)

iii) 2nd Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment: 16 M198, 8 M114A1, 751 men (Designated Direct Support bn for RLT 6)

iv) 3rd Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment: 16 M198, 8 M114A1, 751 men (Designated Direct Support bn for RLT 8)

v) 5th Battalion, 10th Marine Regiment: 12 M109A3, 12 M110A2, 709 men (General Support)

f) 2nd Tank Battalion

i) HQ and Service Company: 2 M60A1, 1 M88A1, 320 men

ii) AT (TOW) Company: 72 TOW HMMWV, 246 men

iii) 4 Tank Companies: 17 M60A1, 1 M88A1, 105 men each

g) 2nd Light Armored Infantry Battalion

i) HQ and Service Company: 4 LAV-25, 8 LAV-C2, 16 LAV-L, 2 LAV-R

ii) Weapons Company: 10 LAV-25, 16 LAV-AT, 8 LAV-M, 1 LAV-R

iii) 3 Light Armored Infantry Companies: 14 LAV-25, 1 LAV-R, 56 scouts each

h) 2nd Reconnaissance Battalion

i) HQ and Service Company: 102 men

ii) 3 Reconnaissance Companies: 79 men each (12 teams of 4 men each)

i) 2nd Assault Amphibian Battalion

i) HQ and Service Company: 15 AAVP-7, 3 AAVC-7, 2 AAVR-7, 237 men

ii) 4 Assault Amphibian Companies: 43 AAVP-7, 3 AAVC-3, 1 AAVR-7, 226 men each

j) 2nd Combat Engineer Battalion

i) HQ and Service Company: 143 men

ii) Engineer Support Company: 259 men

iii) 4 Combat Engineer Companies (1 in cadre status): 114 men each

4) 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing (Designated ACE for II MEF)

a) Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron-2

b) Marine Wing Support Group 27 – Cherry Point, NC

i) Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 27 – Cherry Point, NC

ii) Marine Wing Support Squadron 271 – Cherry Point, NC

iii) Marine Wing Support Squadron 272 – New River, NC

iv) Marine Wing Support Squadron 273 – Beuafort, SC

v) Marine Wing Support Squadron 274 – Cherry Point, NC

c) Marine Air Control Group 28 – Cherry Point, NC

i) Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron 28 – Cherry Point, NC

ii) 3rd Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion: 18 I-Hawk, 751 men

iii) 2nd Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion: 90 Stinger, 377 men

iv) Marine Wing Communication Squadron 28 – Cherry Point, NC

v) Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron 28 – New River, NC

vi) Marine Air Support Squadron 1 – Cherry Point, NC

vii) Marine Air Control Squadron 5 – Beaufort, SC

viii) Marine Air Control Squadron 6 – Cherry Point, NC

d) Marine Aircraft Group 14 – Cherry Point, NC (Designated F/W host MAG for 4th MEB ACE)

i) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 14

ii) VMGR-252 “Otis”: 8 KC-130F, 4 KC-130R

iii) VMAQ-2(-) “Panthers”: 18 EA-6B

iv) VMA(AW)-332 “Polka Dots”: 10 A-6E

v) VMA(AW)-533 “Hawks”: 10 A-6E

vi) VMGRT-253 ”Titans”: 6 KC-130F (FRS, Non-Deployable)

e) Marine Aircraft Group 26 – New River, NC (Designated R/W host MAG for 6th MEB ACE)

i) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 26

ii) HMM-261© “Raging Bulls”: 12 CH-46E

iii) HMM-264 “Black Knights”: 12 CH-46E

iv) HMM-266 “Fighting Griffons”: 12 CH-46E

v) HMH-362 “Ugly Angles”: 22 CH-53D

vi) HMH-461 “Sea Stallions”: 12 CH-53E

vii) HMLA-167 “Warriors”: 13 AH-1T, 11 UH-1N

viii) HMT-204 ”Raptors”: 10 CH-46E, 8 CH-53A (FRS, Non-Deployable)

f) Marine Aircraft Group 29 – New River, NC (Designated R/W host MAG for 4th MEB)

i) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 29

ii) VMO-1(-): 8 OV-10A, 5 OV-10D

iii) HMM-263 “Thunder Eagles”: 12 CH-46E

iv) HMM-365 “Blue Knights”: 12 CH-46E

v) HMH-464(-) “Condors”: 12 CH-53E

vi) HMLA-269(-) “Gunrunners”: 11 AH-1T, 10 UH-1N

g) Marine Aircraft Group 31 – Beaufort, SC (Designated F/W host MAG for 6th MEB ACE)

i) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 31

ii) VMFA-115 “Silver Eagles”: 12 F/A-18

iii) VMFA-122 “Crusaders”: 12 F/A-18

iv) VMFA-251 “Thunderbolts”: 12 F/A-18 (converted 86)

v) VMFA-312 “Checkertails”: 12 F/A-18 (converted 86)

vi) VMFA-451 “Warlords”: 12 F/A-18 (converted from F-4S in 87)

h) Marine Aircraft Group 32 – Cherry Point, NC

i) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 32

ii) VMA-223 “Bulldogs”: 20 AV-8B

iii) VMA-231 “Ace of Spades”: 20 AV-8B

iv) VMA-331 “Bumblebees”: 20 AV-8B

v) VMA-542 “Flying Tigers”: 20 AV-8B

vi) VMAT-203 ”Hawks”: 6 TAV-8B, 13 AV-8B (FRS, Non-Deployable)

5) 2nd Force Service Support Group (CSSE) – Camp Pendleton, CA

a) MEU Service Support Group 24 (CSSE for 24th MEU)

b) MEU Service Support Group 26 (CSSE for 26th MEU)

c) Brigade Service Support Group 4 (CSSE for 4th MEB)

d) Brigade Service Support Group 6 (CSSE for 6th MEB)

e) HQ&Services Battalion

f) 8th Motor Transport Battalion

g) 2nd Maintenance Battalion

h) 8th Engineer Support Battalion

i) 2nd Landing Support Battalion

j) 2nd Supply Battalion

k) 2nd Medical Battalion

l) 2nd Dental Battalion

3. Fleet Marine Forces Reserve

a. 6th Communications Battalion - Bronx, NY

b. 3rd Force Reconnaissance Company – Mobile, AL

c. 4th Force Reconnaissance Company – Alameda, CA

d. 3rd Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company - Long Beach, CA

e. 4th Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company - West Palm Beach, FL

f. 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MAGTF/CE)

g. 4th Marine Division – New Orleans, LA

1) 23rd Marine Regiment – San Bruno, CA

a) HQ Company: 24 TOW (AT-platoon)

b) 1st Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment – Houston, TX

c) 2nd Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment – Encino, CA

d) 3rd Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment – New Orleans, LA

2) 24th Marine Regiment – Kansas City, MO

a) HQ Company: 24 TOW (AT-platoon)

b) 1st Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment – Detroit, MI

c) 2nd Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment – Chicago, IL

d) 3rd Battalion, 24th Marine Regiment – Bridgeton, MO

3) 25th Marine Regiment – Worchester, MA

a) HQ Company: 24 TOW (AT-platoon)

b) 1st Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment – Worchester, MA

c) 2nd Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment – Garden City, NY

d) 3rd Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment – Brookpark, OH

4) 14th Marine Regiment – Fort Worth, TX

a) 1st Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment – Alameda, CA: 24 M198 (Designated Direct Support bn for RLT 23)

b) 2nd Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment – Grand Prairie, TX: 24 M198 (Designated Direct Support bn for RLT 24)

c) 3rd Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment – Philadelphia, PA: 24 M198 (Designated Direct Support bn for RLT 25)

d) 4th Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment – Bessemer, AL: 18 M109A3

e) 5th Battalion, 14th Marine Regiment – Seal Beach, CA: 18 M110A2

5) 4th Tank Battalion – San Diego, CA

a) HQ and Service Company: 2 M60A1, 1 M88A1, 320 men

b) 2 AT (TOW) Platoons: 24 TOW HMMWV, 69 men each

c) 3 Tank Companies: 17 M60A1, 1 M88A1, 105 men each

6) 8th Tank Battalion – Rochester, NY

a) HQ and Service Company: 2 M60A1, 1 M88A1, 320 men

b) AT (TOW) Company: 72 TOW HMMWV, 246 men

c) 4 Tank Companies: 17 M60A1, 1 M88A1, 105 men each

7) 4th Light Armored Infantry Battalion – Camp Pendleton, CA

a) HQ and Service Company: 4 LAV-25, 8 LAV-C2, 16 LAV-L, 2 LAV-R

b) Weapons Company: 10 LAV-25, 16 LAV-AT, 8 LAV-M, 1 LAV-R

c) 3 Light Armored Infantry Companies: 14 LAV-25, 1 LAV-R, 56 scouts each

8) 4th Reconnaissance Battalion – San Antonio, TX

a) HQ and Service Company: 102 men

b) 3 Reconnaissance Companies: 79 men each (12 teams of 4 men each)

9) 4th Assault Amphibian Battalion – Tampa Bay, FL

a) HQ and Service Company: 15 AAVP-7, 3 AAVC-7, 2 AAVR-7, 237 men

b) 2 Assault Amphibian Companies: 43 AAVP-7, 3 AAVC-3, 1 AAVR-7, 226 men each

10) 4th Combat Engineer Battalion – Baltimore, MD

a) HQ and Service Company: 143 men

b) Engineer Support Company: 259 men

c) 4 Combat Engineer Companies (1 in cadre status): 114 men each

h. 4th Marine Air Wing – New Orleans, LA

1) Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron 4

2) Marine Wing Support Group 47 – Selfridge, MI

a) Marine Wing Support Squadron 471 – Minneapolis, MN

b) Marine Wing Support Squadron 472 – El Toro, CA

c) Marine Wing Support Squadron 473 – South Weymouth, MA

d) Marine Wing Support Squadron 474 – Philadelphia, PA

3) Marine Air Control Group 48 – Glenview, IL

a) 4th Light Antiaircraft Missile Battalion – Fresno, CA: 18 I-Hawk, 751 men

b) 4th Low Altitude Air Defense Battalion – Pasadena, CA: 90 Stinger, 377 men

c) Marine Wing Communication Squadron 48 – Memphis, TN

d) Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron 48 – Memphis, TN

e) Marine Air Support Squadron 6 – South Weymouth, MA

f) Marine Air Control Squadron 23 – Aurora, CO

g) Marine Air Control Squadron 24 – Dam Neck, VA

4) Marine Aircraft Group 41 – Dallas, TX (Fighter F/W MAG)

a) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 41

b) VMFA-112 “Cowboys” - Dallas, TX: 14 F-4S

c) VMGR-234 “Rangers” – Glenview, IL: 8 KC-130T, 7 KC-130F

d) Det B HMH-772 – Dallas, TX: 7 CH-53A

5) Marine Aircraft Group 42 – Alameda, CA (Attack F/W MAG)

a) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 42

b) VMA-124 “Whistling Death” – Memphis, TN: 19 A-4M Skyhawk

c) VMA-133 “Dragons” – Alameda, CA: 14 A-4F

d) VMA-142 “Flying Gators” – Cecil Field, FL: 15 A-4M

e) VMAQ-4 “Seahawks” – Whidbey Island, WA: 5 EA-6A

f) Det A HMH-772 – Alameda, CA: 7 CH-53A

6) Marine Aircraft Group 46 – El Toro, CA (R/W MAG)

a) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 46

b) VMFA-134 “Smoke” – El Toro, CA: 6 F/A-18 (converted from F-4 in early 89)

c) HMM-764 “Moonlighters” – El Toro, CA: 10 CH-46E

d) HMM-774 “Wild Goose” – Norfolk, VA: 14 CH-46E

e) HML-767 “Nomads” – New Orleans, LA: 13 UH-1N

f) HMA-775 “Coyotes” – Camp Pendleton, CA: 12 AH-1J

g) VMFT-401 ”Snipers”: 13 F-21A (Aggressor, Non-Deployable)

7) Marine Aircraft Group 49 – Willow Grove, PA (R/W MAG)

a) Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron 49

b) VMFA-321 “Hell’s Angels” – Andrews AFB, MD: 12 F-4S

c) VMA-131 “Diamondbacks” – Willow Grove, PA: 14 A-4M (from A-4F in 88)

d) VMA-322 “Fighting Gamecocks” – South Weymouth, MA: 14 A-4M

e) VMGR-452 “Yankees” – Stewart ANGB, NY: 8 KC-130T

f) VMO-4 “Evil Eyes” – Atlanta: 16 OV-10A

g) HMH-772(-) “Hustler” – Willow Grove, PA: 7 CH-53A

h) HML-771 “Hummers” – South Weymouth, MA: 8 UH-1N

i) HMA-773 “Red Dogs” – Atlanta; GA: 15 AH-1J

j) HML-776 “Gangsters” – Glenview, IL: 7 UH-1N

i. 4th Force Service Support Group (CSSE) - New Orleans, LA

1) HQ&Services Battalion

2) 6th Motor Transport Battalion

3) 4th Maintenance Battalion

4) 6th Engineer Support Battalion

5) 4th Landing Support Battalion

6) 4th Supply Battalion

7) 4th Medical Battalion

8) 4th Dental Battalion

[01/B3]

Om tredje världskriget hade brytit ut under Kalla kriget, vad hade då USMC spelat för roll i NATO:s försvar av Europa? Som jag har förstått det är USMC mer av en brandkårsstyrka som inte klarar av långvariga kampanjer, men som är snabba att rycka ut, i jämförelse med US army som skulle kunna bedriva en mer långvarig kampanj väl på plats.

 

Innebär detta att de kanske bara skulle användas initialt i konflikten eller skulle de vara någon sorts reserv som kunde användas senare om fronten stabiliterats till att agera "shocktrupper" och skapa genombrytningar i linjen?

 

Vet inte om det finns nå rätt eller fel på denna fråga, är total novis, men skulle vara intressant om någon upplyst kunde ge lite insyn i denna fråga

Jag gör ett försök att svara lite mer på din fråga begränsat till Europa - den större delen av USMC hade sina huvuduppgifter utanför Europa.

 

Marinkåren var (är) ett förband som hade uppgifter i alla lägen, från fred till världskrig, ett förband avsett att användas och som också användes. Marinkåren hade kontinuerligt en bataljonsstridsgrupp (MAU/MEU) "forward-deployed" på landstigningsfartyg i Medelhavet och dessa stridsgrupper användes till allt möjligt i övningar, räddningsinsatser, i Libanon mm. Vid ett storkrig skulle MEU kunna användas som en brandkårsstyrka i inledningen men samtidigt med möjlighet att förbereda mottagande av ytterligare förband. Något som jag tycker är ovant att tänka är att vid en insats finns bara en MAGTF. (Om man studerar hur Marinkåren sattes in vid det första Gulfkriget är detta tydligt. Det kan alltså inte strida två brigader (MEB) sida vid sida utan om ytterligare en brigad tillförs så organiseras en MEF och GCE/ACE/CSSE från respektive brigad bildar ett GCE, ett ACE och ett CSSE i MEF.)

 

När det gäller Europa så hade Marinkåren några fastare punkter i en i övrigt mycket flexibel organisation:

- NALMEB, förhandslager i Trøndelag för en MEB (som Eskil och dieseltrollet nämnt);

- MPS Squadron 1, förhandslager till sjöss för en MEB;

- LF6F, en MEU grupperad till sjöss i Medelhavet

- Amphibious Group 2, landstigningsfartyg på Östkusten med kapacitet att transportera en MEB.

 

Marinkåren skulle i sin helhet kunnat användas i Medelhavsområdet. LF6F till sjöss skulle då ha säkrat en hamn och en flygplats och sedan skulle trupp och flygplan flygas in och utrustning och underhåll förhandslagrat till sjöss på Atlanten skulle lossas i hamnen så att MEU växt till en MEB. För att styrka skulle kunna byggas ut till en MEF krävdes tillförsel av ytterligare motsvarande två brigader vars utrustning kunde transporteras på landstigningsfartyg och/eller militära transportfartyg.

 

Man kan också tänka sig att LF6F sätts in i Medelhavsområdet, att en MEB flygs in till Norge/Trøndelag men att själva MEF II (reducerad) sätts in i Danmark genom landstigning av motsvarande en brigad från landstigningsfartyg (AE), förstärkt med motsvarande en brigad som flygs in (FIE) och vars utrustning kommer från MPSRON-1 och att reservförband motsvarande en brigad tillkommer på transportfartyg i ett senare skede (AFOE). Kombinationerna är om inte oändliga så åtminstone många!

 

Undrar om mitt intresse för USMC kommer sig av att jag själv började i Sveriges motsvarighet - sjövärnskåren - redan 1991 ?

[01/B3]

Hmm, det verkar inte riktigt som att så många andra har USMC under 1980-talet som favoritämne. (Marinkåristerna själva verkar betrakta 80-talet som det förlorade årtiondet då de aldrig fick kriga - i alla förbands historik finns en stor lucka mellan Vietnam och Gulfkriget.)

 

Jag försöker med att diskutera något som kanske intresserar fler här uppe i norr. Vi börjar med några artiklar från tiden när det begav sig:

Operation In Cold Weather:

[...] The United States has a bilateral treaty with Norway to participate in the defense of Norway with a brigade size unit from the United States Marine Corps. This unit will have some of its equipment and supplies prestocked in Norway (finished in 1989). The size of the unit is determined, but no unit has been earmarked. A standing headquarters (4th MAB) is responsible for all planning for Norway. Participating units in exercises in Norway come all from FMF Atlantic. FMF Atlantic also sends units to the Mediterranean and Okinawa (MAU) on a permanent basis and also units to other parts in Europe, the Middle East, Central America/Carribbean Ocean. FMF Atlantic is also responsible for planning of a MPS configurate MAB (6th MAB). [...]

Can We Move The Men And Equipment To North Norway In Time?:

[...] The reason the Norway prepositioning program seems to lack real deterrence relates to the prepositioning sites chosen for the MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade). During the initial negotiations between the U.S. and Norway concerning prepositioning locations, the Norwegian government expressed concern about upsetting the Nordic balance if the Marine Corps prepositioned equipment in North Norway close to the employment area and the Soviet border. This Nordic balance consists of a close relationship and interdependence which exists within the Nordic region and although it does not include security arrangements, each country is fully aware that any significant step taken by one will affect the others. Because of these Norwegian concerns the negotiators agreed that the MEB equipment would be stored in central Norway near Trondheim and the Marines would fly into Trondheim, marry up with their equipment and redeploy to North Norway. This redeployment was to be the responsibility of Norway. Because of the limited LOCs that exist in central and north Norway it seems doubtful that this force of 13,000 Marines can be deployed to Norway, marry up with their equipment, then redeploy north fast enough to provide a creditable deterrence to the Soviets. Norway, North of Trondheim, is rugged country with high mountains, deep valleys and many fjords. The land routes that could be used to redeploy the MEB to the north consist of one road and one rail line. Both pass through numerous tunnels and deep valleys, cross many bridges and must cross two fjords that can only be traversed by ferry. Considering this, land redeployment does not provide the kinds of trafficability and dependability that would convince the Soviets that the MEB could quickly move north. Air transport of the MAB north also is not considered a viable redeployment option because the MEBs heavy equipment would require too many aircraft and too many sorties to even get close to providing the timely movement necessary for deterrence. That leaves sea transport as the only practical way to move the MEB, but the problem of timeliness for redeployment still exists. When the troops are airlifted into Norway they must travel the roads in the reception area to staging areas, marry up with their equipment, then move to the ports for seaborne redeployment. There is a limited road network in and around Trondheim and most roads are only two lanes wide which would limit the volume of traffic. Can the road network handle all this movement? Roads are not the only difficulty, there are also limited port facilities in both Trondheim and the employment area. Will these facilities be able to handle the volume of traffic? What are the odds that even if all of the logistics problems could be worked out, that the ships carrying the Marines would make it to the north considering enemy submarines and aircraft and the weather? [...]

How Secure is NATO's Northern Cap?:

[...] Host nation support and adequate seaports in the north are lacking; these matters need immediate attention. Early positioning of supplies and equipment is crucial, and the land-based prepositioning program the United States Marine Corps is conducting currently in Norway is an excellent beginning. However, although U.S. Marines train at two sites, the facilities, equipment, and support at these sites are inadequate. Recognizing that amphibious assaults need to be practiced constantly because of the difficult terrain and terrible weather, one Marine commander, who trained at these sites and then participated in several northern Norway exercises, expressed his concerns. For example, he indicated that amphibious landings were extremely difficult in the fjords and, even after landing, one unit progressed only thirty meters through deep snow after more than one and a half hours of intense effort because of the lack of proper snow-removal equipment. He concluded that much better equipment is vital if the Marines are to be successful in northern Norway. [...]

 

Den stora rollen för USMC i Europa var att förstärka försvaret av Norge. De hade en hel del materiel förhandslagrad där just för detta.

"The Marine Corps deploys by brigades, but fights by divisions." I tidigare inlägg har jag resonerat kring hur man kunde ha transporterat brigader (motsvarande) till ett operationsområde för att sätta upp en hel MEF. (Senare, efter gulfkriget, avskaffades brigaden som självständig MAGTF för att sedan återkomma efter några år.) Om WW3 hade brutit ut så hade marinkårens planerare försökt att hitta den bästa användningen för hela II MEF men skulle det ha varit möjligt för USMC att gruppera hela II MEF i den förväntade stridszonen i Nordnorge/Troms? Jag tvivlar inte alls på att det skulle ha varit en högt prioriterad uppgift att gruppera NALMEB i Norge utan min fråga är hur troligt det är brigaden sedan förstärkts.

 

Artiklarna ovan tar upp problemen med att transportera markförband i Norge (ingen nyhet för den som själv varit där). Detta skulle även försvåra gruppering av en hel division i Nordnorge men jag tror inte att det skulle ha varit det främsta problemet. (Under 80-talet planerade NATO att Nordnorge utöver NALMEB åtminstone skulle försvaras av norska brigader (5), en kanadensisk brigad, en brittisk/nederländsk marinkårsbrigad och kanske AMF så två ytterligare brigader skulle väl inte ha inneburit någon total scenförändring på marken.) Det jag ser som det största problemet är i stället var USMC skulle ha grupperat MEF ACE.

 

MAW F/W ac:

48 F/A-18

20 A-6

60 AV-8

mm

 

MAW R/W ac:

60 CH-46

36 CH-53

24 AH-1

20 UH-1

 

Helikoptrarna har inte så stora krav på landningsbanor men var skulle flygplanen grupperas inom 200 miles (~32 mil) från Troms? I Norge fanns fyra militära flygfält inom den radien men de skulle även ta emot andra allierade flygförband. (NALMEB-flygbaserna Værnes och Ørland ligger betydligt längre bort - snarare 70 mil.)

Andøya: 6 norska P-3 och planerad förstärkning med 18 A-10 och 24 F-4 (COB)

Bardufoss: planerad förstärkning med 18 amerikanska RF-4 (COB) och 16 brittiska jaguar och 16 brittiska harrier

Evenes: planerad förstärkning med 18 amerikanska A-7 (COB)

Bodø: 32 norska F-16 och planerad förstärkning med 48 amerikanska F-16 (COB)

 

Jag har svårt att se att hela ACE skulle få plats. Givetvis skulle det hinna hända en del på de veckor det skulle ta innan hela förbandet var på plats men det skulle lika väl kunna innebära att baser förstördes som att det blev glesare på befintliga baser. Någon som har några synpunkter? (Kanske Kiruna, Gällivare och Jokkmokk hade varit av intresse? )

 

Beroende på läget i Norge skulle det också ha kunnat bli aktuellt med en insats i södra Norge men då hade en del flygplan kunnat basera i Storbritannien.

[01/B3]

Jag kan inte låta bli att använda marinkårens egna förkortningar. Förklaring finns i det första dokumentet som jag länkade till - och på nätet

 

Jag rotade fram en gammal artikel skriven av en officer i marinkåren (LtCol Robert B. Lange) som tjänstgjorde som förbindelseofficer hos HQ 3d United States Air Force där han tar upp dessa problem:

[...] Throughout this exercise, a not-so-unique communication problem arose that would have been humorous if its potential results were not so obviously distastrous. Let me set the stage: It's 0200, you've been on watch for six hours, only six hours to go. For days intelligence reports have shown increasing tensions leading to general alert. The II MEF is preparing to redeploy from its United Kingdom cantonment sites to the European continent. A secret NATO flash message crosses my desk: The Marines are moving, and every agency in the Western world is copying the message - every embassy, every major command, every subordinate command, all major bases, airfields, and supply depots are notified. Instantly, all three telephones on my desk light up like Christmas trees. The U.S. Marine Corps is about to embark on its greatest action since World War II and what huge tactical questions cross my desk? None. I am in the decryptation business. What is An MEF? an AAV? and tens of other Marine exclusive items? The calls seemed endless. Fleet Marine Force Europe launches a six-page movement message that nobody outside its own headquartes (and, I suggest, very few within it) could fully decrypt. Hundreds of constantly changing acronyms are used throughout NATO. Gota problem with enemy air? Good news, the ACE is located only 10 kilometers away. Unfortunately, it's not an aviation combat element, it's Allied Command Europe. Constant confusion, questions, and misinterpretation result from the massive overuse of acronyms in written communications. Quite simply, the purpose of Marine communication is to communicate: clarity, conciseness, and completeness should be the key-words, no falsely perceived brevity that requires significant Marine-only description before comprehension is possible. [...]

[eskil]

Hmm, det verkar inte riktigt som att så många andra har USMC under 1980-talet som favoritämne. (Marinkåristerna själva verkar betrakta 80-talet som det förlorade årtiondet då de aldrig fick kriga - i alla förbands historik finns en stor lucka mellan Vietnam och Gulfkriget.)

Nja, vi har ju "operation Urgent Fury" (invasionen av Grenada) och operationerna i Libanon. Men något storkrig blev det aldrig under 1980-talet, guskelov.

 

Jag tvivlar inte alls på att det skulle ha varit en högt prioriterad uppgift att gruppera NALMEB i Norge utan min fråga är hur troligt det är brigaden sedan förstärkts.

Det skulle nog till stor del bero på hur situationen utvecklat sig. Om ryssarna hade satsat stort på att tränga långt söder ut på så kort tid som möjligt så hade vi nog fått se fler USMC-förband engagera sig i Norge. I scenariot från "Röd Storm" så sätts marinkåren in på Island. I scenariot från "Operation Garbo" så sätts den in i Östersjön. Allt utifrån vad som är möjligt och fördelaktigt.

[01/B3]

Nja, vi har ju "operation Urgent Fury" (invasionen av Grenada) och operationerna i Libanon. Men något storkrig blev det aldrig under 1980-talet, guskelov.

Både de här insatserna omfattade bara en bataljonsstridsgrupp i taget (MAU, tidigare beteckning på MEU) och jämfört med krigen under 40-talet (VK2), 50-talet (Korea), 60/70-talen (Vietnam), 90-talet (Gulfkriget) och 00-talet (Irak och Afganistan) så tror jag att det var alldeles för lite krig för Marinkårens smak. 80-talet brukar beskrivas ungefär så här: "it deployed in numerous operations and exercises throughout the 1980s". Jag tror inte att de tycker att sådant är något att minnas med stolthet.

 

Invasionerna av Grenada 1983 och Panama 1989/90 utfördes främst av armén.

 

MAGTF (SOC): Making Our Primary Force Development Objective A Reality:

[...] The national-level decision not to employ a MAGTF (6th MEB in the original plan) to participate/conduct Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in December, 1990, was viewed by many Marines as the Army's encroachment on the Corps' well-earned historical status as the Nation's force-in-readiness, and a signal that our (SOC) lacked credibility. This claim, which appeared logical considering the Army's quest for a new role (funding) in wake of the recent collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe, that eliminated a large portion its primary mission, was not entirely valid. In retrospect, however, the apparently abrupt transformation of JUST CAUSE into largely "an Army show" is more plausible than it originally appeared in light of the facts that:

(1) the pre-existing Army support infrastructure in Panama was unique and Army-oriented, and

(2) the desire for OPSEC caused Army planners to not inform the Corps of the change to OPLAN task organization. [...]

Insatsen i Libanon var som en del av en fredsbevarande styrka - inte vad Marinkåren tränar för.

Tactical Lessons For Peacekeeping: U.S. Multinational Force In Beriut 1982-1984 :

[...] Combat forces, which are not trained in peacekeeping theory and tactics, are restricted to operate in a predictable set-piece pattern as directed by their higher headquarters. This pattern creates a vulnerability in the peacekeeping force that is easily exploited by parties hostile to the force. Additionally, in unfamiliar stressful situations, these forces tend to respond as they would in conventional combat, and not the way they should respond in peacekeeping. Excessive force makes peacekeepers a party to the conflict instead of a neutral third party. [...]

Finally, even if untrained peacekeeping forces are committed only for a short time, the huge benefit to non-state actors by humiliating an elite force in front of an aggressive international media, puts the force at high risk. Decisionmakers committing forces must recognize and be willing to accept this risk. [...]

[01/B3]

Jag plockade fram de gamla klassikerna och letade fram avsnitten om Marinkåren.

 

I "Röd Storm" dyker Marinkåren upp på ett antal ställen:

- Innan krigets utbrott ska Nimitz CVBG eskortera en MAU till Island;

- När de inte hinner dit får man veta att en marinkårsbrigad redan finns i Norge men att det visar sig svårt att få dit MAU så därför skickas den till Tyskland;

- I slutet av boken eskorterar Independence CVBG Tarawa (LHA), Guam (LPH), Nassau (LHA), Inchon (LPH) och tjugo andra landstigningsfartyg med en marinkårsdivision till Island. Man får också veta att Pentagon hade läckt att denna division var på väg till Tyskland. Landstigningsfartygsgruppen (PHIBGRU) har kapacitet för att transportera en brigad med utrustning men det framgår inte hur resten av divisionen skulle transporteras. (När 4th och 5th MEB transporterades inför Gulfkriget skedde det på Iwo Jima (LPH), Guam (LPH), Nassau (LHA) och tio ytterligare landstigningsfartyg (4th MEB) respektive New Orleans (LPH), Tarawa (LHA), Tripoli (LPH) och tio ytterligare landstigningsfartyg (5th MEB). Det är befogat att koncentrera sig på helikopterfartygen (LPH/LHA/LHD) genom att det är dessa som transporterar huvuddelen av truppen - en infanteribataljon vardera.)

 

I "Operation Garbo" figurerar Marinkåren främst i landstigningen på Gotland i del II. Det är lite förvirrande ifall två olika MAGTF är inblandade - en MEU och 2nd MEB - men jag tror att tanken är att det är en MEB varav en del transporteras på landstigningsfartyg (AE); Wasp (LHD) och tre stycken Whidbey Island (LSD) medan resterande delar flygs in (FIE). Det är lite märkligt att MPS-fartygen som har brigadens tunga utrustning planeras anlända ett par timmar efter landstigningen då beräknad tid för att lossa ett MPS-fartyg var 10 dagar. Det är helt klart möjligt att MPS-fartyg skulle kunna delta i en landstigning men det vore att ta en mycket stor risk. Enligt boken utförs landstigningen två dagar efter att beslut fattas, och 24 dagar efter beslut om förhöjd beredskap. I del III, två dagar senare, får man veta att 4th MEB i Trondheimsområdet hunnit utrusta. (2nd MEB (CE) var vid den tidpunkten en reservbrigad, det var i stället 6th MEB som var MPS-brigad.)

 

De kanske bästa källorna till hur Marinkåren skulle ha använts är två rapporter från Naval War Collage:

Global War Game: The First Five Years

Global War Game: Second Series 1984-1988

 

Brigader (MAB/MEB) sätts in i Norge, Pakistan, Turkiet, Kurilerna mm men II MAF (och senare I MAF från Stilla havet) sätts in i Nordtyskland/Danmark.

 

Här är en beskrivning av hur synen på användandet av Marinkåren förändrades (från det första dokumentet).

Marine Corps

Concurrent with trends in other areas, Marine Corps employment also underwent evolutionary change. Early games saw the Marines extensively involved with the RDF and operations in Southwest Asia. However, while the Marines committed to this effort constituted a valuable resource, they faced the same problems the RDF as a whole faced—Red forces in theater were numerically superior and possessed short, well-defended supply lines. In contrast, the RDF started out with a significant numerical disadvantage and was at the end of an extended and vulnerable supply train. Reinforcements were limited, as other theaters had equally pressing demands. Additionally, the lift assets available to deliver reinforcements and logistic support were also limited. Thus, the Marines were part of a force that faced a battle in a remote region of the world, in a disadvantageous position with little prospect for help. Consequently, Marine involvement in this area entailed primarily withdrawals or defensive operations, roles which did not fully utilize their capabilities. As a result, Blue began to emphasize their use in other theaters where their unique talents could be better exploited. A primary region for such use was northern Norway. Though Marines had been committed to the defense of Norway throughout the series, initially their role was to bolster defense. Marines deployed to ground positions in Norway as well as to Iceland with aircraft and SAM batteries. However, in line with the overall shift in Blue thought, Marine employment changed to a more active offensive campaign of amphibious assaults against the advancing Red forces. Such operations contributed directly to enhancing the security of the NATO northern flank and threatening Red base areas. Marine air was particularly valuable in these operations. Shore-based aircraft directly supported NATO ground forces, aided the defense of CVBGs, and were a significant component of the air campaign against Red installations in the Kola. Marine activity in the Far East underwent a pronounced change. At first the Marines were engaged in static defense or acted as a force in reserve. Principal roles included the reinforcement of Korea and the Aleutians. By 1983 the Marines were actively engaged in offensive amphibious operations against Red-occupied islands in the Kuriles. These operations were significant from a strategic perspective in that they infringed on the flank of Red Pacific Fleet SSBN bastions. Marines were also active in the Mediterranean. During several games, Marine forces were landed in Thrace to support Greece and Turkey. Their efforts were important components of the Blue reaction to the Red 1981 offensive to seize the Turkish Straits and a corridor to the Mediterranean. Marine actions in both GWG 1982 and GWG 1983 against the Red southern flank caused the enemy to focus additional attention on this area. The 1983 operation drew more Red attention because of the stalemated conditions on the Central Front.

[01/B3]

Hittade en helt ny artikel idag och jag kan inte låta bli att dela den med er!

 

Don't Rock the Boat Reinforcing Norway in Crisis and War

 

U.S. Marine Amphibious Brigade

Militarily, the most important force likely to deploy into Norway is the 4th American Amphibious Brigade (MAB), part of the 2nd Marine Amphibious Force (MAF). The 2MAF is deployed on the East Coast of the United States and has the Northern European Command as a first priority for deployment; equipment for the 4MAB is prepositioned in Norway. If the MAB is deployed to Norway, it would be the largest and most capable NATO force there; Table 6.1 lists its key gournd combat equipment, along with a typical Norwegian brigade for comparison. The strength of the MAB comes from its strong combined arms capability (gour, air, and amphibious) and its professional training. Combined with the British/Dutch Marine Commandos, the MAB would greatly increase the combat potential of NATO in North Norway. SACLANT has the option of deploying the remainder of the 2nd MAF (the ”2MAF Residual”) as well. According to Norwegian officials, the deployment time for the 4MAB may be about 20 days and the 2MAF Residual about 45 days; however, the deployment time could be reduced substantially if the units were brought into position off the Norwegian coast in advance, or if some personnel were airlifted to Norway when base access was permitted. Subsequent deployment from central Norway to North Norway would require four to six days using a combination of air, sea, and ground transportation.

The likely composition of the tactical air component of the MAB would be:

 

- 48 F/A-18 Hornet fighter/attack aircraft

- 40 AV-8B Harrier V/STOL (vertical/short takeoff and landing) ground support aircraft

- 4 EA-6 Prowler electronic warfare aircraft

- 4 RF-4B Phantom reconnaissance aircraft

- 6 KC-130 Hercules aerial refueling aircraft

- 6 I-Hawk surface-to-air missile launchers.

 

In addition, some 12 attack helicopters, 90 troop and cargo carrying helicopters, and 12 observation aircraft would be deployed. Normally, a MAB would deploy 10 A-6 Intruder bombers, but the Norwegians objected to these aircraft. However, if war had started, the Norwegian objections would probably disappear and the Marines may attempt to deploy these aircraft, although the absence of prepositioned equipment for them would make this more difficult.

In1986, the MAB exercised its deployment plan. Most elements of the MAB were airlifted directly to Evenes in North Norway. The MAB has certain heavy equipment prepositioned (POMCUS) in central Norway; units that needed this equipment were airlifted to Trondheim. Additional equipment was loaded on roll-on/roll-off ships in the United States and sealifted to Bogen Bay, 20 miles from Evenes. Fixed-wing aircraft were deployed to Bodø. Clearly, such deployment would be vulnerable to Soviet interdiction efforts if the MAB had not arrived prior to hostilities, illustrating the problem for all allied reinforcements.

En del nytt för mig, särskilt när det gäller omgrupperingen till Nordnorge. Uppgiften om 48 F/A-18 är felaktig och motiveras på följande sätt i en not:

Normally the composition of the tactical air component of a MAB includes only 24 F/A-18s and 20 AV-8Bs (i.e., one squadron of each), but several credible sources state that the Marine air element includes two F-18 squadrons and two AV-8B squadrons

En VMFA med F/A-18 består av 12 flygplan så två divisioner blir just de typiska 24 flygplanen. VMA med AV-8B innehåller däremot 20 flygplan.

Edited January 28, 2009 by 01/B3

[lampros]

I denna tråd har det talats om den USMC-brigad som hade sin materiel lagrad i Nordnorge, på 80-talet, för insats där i ett skarpt läge.

 

Intressant i sammanhanget är att infanteristerna inte hade SKIDOR utan SNÖSKOR. Fräckt.

[A2Keltainen]

Ni som snoat in er pa amnet i denna trad, har ni hittat nagot om eventuella planer pa att med USMC besatta Bornholm i handelse av en konflikt mellan NATO/WP? Hur sag det ut med tillgangen pa landningsbanor pa Bornholm under kalla kriget?

[A2Keltainen]

Intressant i sammanhanget är att infanteristerna inte hade SKIDOR utan SNÖSKOR. Fräckt.

 

Jag gissar att den genomsnittlige USMC-infanteristens skidloparformaga i allmanhet, och i hart kuperad norsk terrang i synnerhet, lamnar en del att onska, for att uttrycka det nagot diplomatiskt.

[01/B3]

Ni som snoat in er pa amnet i denna trad, har ni hittat nagot om eventuella planer pa att med USMC besatta Bornholm i handelse av en konflikt mellan NATO/WP? Hur sag det ut med tillgangen pa landningsbanor pa Bornholm under kalla kriget?

Välkommen tillbaka A2

Du har saknats - till exempel i tråden om Finska Försvaret.

 

Jag har läst mycket om detta ämne och det finns inte mycket publicerat om verkliga planer. Det finns mer att läsa om övningar och tänkbara scenarion och där är Jylland ett återkommande område. Jag tror inte att det hade varit aktuellt att sätta in USMC på Bornholm. För det första skulle luft- och sjöhotet varit mycket stort med närhet till mängder av flygbaser och ett stort antal ubåtar. Sedan är Bornholm inte av någon central betydelse för försvaret av Västeuropa att det skulle motivera riskerna. Sedan tror jag att Marinkåren skulle ha koncentrerats till områden där det varit möjligt att sätta in hel hel MAF/MEF och det hade det nog inte varit på Bornholm.

 

Enligt wikipedia har Rønne 2000 m landningsbana.

[Kryptörn]

Ni som snoat in er pa amnet i denna trad, har ni hittat nagot om eventuella planer pa att med USMC besatta Bornholm i handelse av en konflikt mellan NATO/WP? Hur sag det ut med tillgangen pa landningsbanor pa Bornholm under kalla kriget?

Intressant nog var icke-danska NATO-förband non grata på Bornholm under större delen av kalla kriget. Danmark hade nämligen ålagt sig själv hårda begränsningar vilka styrkor man tillät på ön, vilket var en kvarleva från den sovjetiska ockupationen efter andra världskriget. Visserligen planerade man för att förstärka Bornholm i händelse av krig, men eftersom inga icke-danska förband fick besöka ön för att öva sina krigsuppgifter var det ett något egendomligt arrangemang. Så sent som 1982 vägrade Danmark att tillåta att USAF:s marschorkester besökte ön, eftersom dom då 1) skulle vara iklädda uniform och betraktas som ett utländskt förband och 2) skulle landa med ett utländskt (amerikanskt) militärflygplan på Bornholm.

 

1983-84 gaskade man dock upp sig på danskt håll och tillät amerikanskt och västtyskt militärflyg att tillfälligt basera på ön, visserligen ackompanjerat av sovjetiskt morrande men ändå.

 

De egna danska styrkorna på Bornholm bestod av regementet Bornholms Vaern, som i mitten av åttiotalet bestod bland annat av tre skyttebataljoner, en haubitsbataljon och ett stridsvagnskompani, alltså i praktiken en reducerad brigad.